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Abstract
A theory of measurement uncertainty is presented, which, since it
is based exclusively on the Bayesian approach and on the subjective
concept of conditional probability, is applicable in the most general
cases.
The recent International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
recommendation on measurement uncertainty is reobtained as the
limit case in which linearization is meaningful and one is interested
only in the best estimates of the quantities and in their variances.
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Introduction
The value of a physical quantity obtained as a result of a measurement has a
degree of uncertainty, due to unavoidable errors, of which one can recognize
the source but never establish the exact magnitude. The uncertainty due to
so called statistical errors is usually treated using the frequentistic concept of
confidence intervals, although the procedure is rather unnatural and there are
known cases (of great relevance in frontier research) in which this approach
is not applicable. On the other hand, there is no way, within this frame, to
handle uncertainties due to systematic errors in a consistent way.
∗Special contribution to the session “The role and meaning of conditional probability in
Bayesian statistics”, Section on Bayesian Statistical Science at the “1996 Joint Statistical
Meetings”, Chicago, Illinois, August 4-8, 1996.
Email: dagostini@vaxrom.roma1.infn.it
1
Bayesian statistics, however, allows a theory of measurement uncertainty
to be built which is applicable to all cases. The outcomes are in agreement
with the recommendation of the Bureau International des Poids et Mesures
(BIPM) and of the International Organization for the Standardization (ISO),
which has also recognized the crucial role of subjective probability in assessing
and expressing measurement uncertainty.
In the next section I will make some remarks about the implicit use in
science of the intuitive concept of probability as degree of belief. Then I
will briefly discuss the part of the BIPM recommendation which deals with
subjective probability. The Bayesian theory of uncertainty which provides
the mathematical foundation of the recommendation will be commented
upon. Finally I will introduce an alternative theory, based exclusively on
the Bayesian approach and on conditional probability. More details, includ-
ing many practical examples, can be found in [1].
Claimed frequentism versus practiced subjectivism
Most physicists (I deal here mainly with Physics because of personal biases,
but the remarks and the conclusions could easily be extended to other fields
of research) have received a scientific education in which the concept of prob-
ability is related to the ratio of favorable over possible events, and to relative
frequencies for the outcomes of repeated experiments. Usually the first ”def-
inition” (combinatorial) is used in theoretical calculations and the second one
(frequentistic) in empirical evaluations. The subjective definition of proba-
bility, as “degree of belief”, is, instead, viewed with suspicion and usually
misunderstood. The usual criticism is that “science must be objective” and,
hence that “there should be no room for subjectivity”. Some even say: “I do
not believe something. I assess it. This is not a matter for religion!”.
It is beyond the purposes of this paper to discuss the issue of the so called
”objectivity” of scientific results. I would just like to remind the reader that,
as well expressed by the science historian Galison[2],
“Experiments begin and end in a matrix of beliefs. . . . beliefs in in-
strument types, in programs of experiment enquiry, in the trained,
individual judgements about every local behavior of pieces of appara-
tus . . . ”.
In my experience, and after interviewing many colleagues from several
countries, physicists use (albeit unconsciously) the intuitive concept of prob-
ability as “degree of belief”, even for “professional purposes”. Nevertheless,
they have difficulty in accepting such a definition rationally, because - in my
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opinion - of their academic training. For example, apart from a small minor-
ity of orthodox frequentists, almost everybody accepts statements of the kind
“there is 90% probability that the value of the Top quark mass is between
. . . ”. In general, in fact, even the frequentistic concept of confidence interval
is usually interpreted in a subjective way, and the correct statement (accord-
ing to the frequentistic school) of “90% probability that the observed value
lies in an interval around µ” is usually turned around into a “90% probability
that µ is around the observed value” (µ indicates hereafter the true value).
The reason is rather simple. A physicist - to continue with our example -
seeks to obtain some knowledge about µ and, consciously or not, wants to
understand which values of µ have high or low degrees of belief; or which
intervals ∆µ have large or small probability. A statement concerning the
probability that a measured value falls within a certain interval around µ is
sterile if it cannot be turned into an expression which states the quality of the
knowledge of µ itself. Unfortunately, few scientists are aware that this can
be done in a logically consistent way only by using the Bayes’ theorem and
some a` priori degrees of belief. In practice, since one often deals with simple
problems in which the likelihood is normal and the uniform distribution is
a reasonable prior (in the sense that the same degree of belief is assigned
to all the infinite values of µ) the Bayes’ formula is formally “by-passed”
and the likelihood is taken as if it described the degrees of belief for µ after
the outcome of the experiment is known (i.e. the final probability density
function, if µ is a continuous quantity).
BIPM and ISO Recommendation on the measurement
uncertainty
An example which shows how this intuitive way of reasoning is so natural
for the physicist can be found in the BIPM recommendation INC-1 (1980)
about the “expression of experimental uncertainty”[3]. It states that
The uncertainty in the result of a measurement generally consists of
several components which may be grouped into two categories accord-
ing to the way in which their numerical value is estimated:
A: those which are evaluated by statistical methods;
B: those which are evaluated by other means.
Then it specifies that
The components in category B should be characterized by quantities
u2j , which may be considered as approximations to the corresponding
variances, the existence of which is assumed. The quantities u2j may be
treated like variances and the quantities uj like standard deviations.
Clearly, this recommendation is meaningful only in a Bayesian framework.
In fact, the recommendation has been criticized because it is not supported
by conventional statistics (see e.g. [4] and references therein). Nevertheless,
it has been approved and reaffirmed by the CIPM (Comite´ International des
Poids et Mesures) and adopted by ISO in its “Guide to the expression of un-
certainty in measurement”[5] and by NIST (National Institute of Standards
and Technology) in an analogous guide[6]. In particular, the ISO Guide
recognizes the crucial role of subjective probability in Type B uncertainties:
”. . . Type B standard uncertainty is obtained from an assumed proba-
bility density function based on the degree of belief that an event will
occur [often called subjective probability . . . ].”
“Recommendation INC-1 (1980) upon which this Guide rests implic-
itly adopts such a viewpoint of probability ... as the appropriate way
to calculate the combined standard uncertainty of a result of a mea-
surement.”
The BIPM recommendation and the ISO Guide deal only with definitions and
with “variance propagation”, performed, as usual, by linearization. A general
theory has been proposed by Weise and Wo¨ger[4]. which they maintain
should provide the mathematical foundation of the Guide. Their theory
is based on Bayesian statistics and on the principle of maximum entropy.
Although the authors show how powerful it is in many applications, the use
of the maximum entropy principle is, in my opinion, a weak point which
prevents the theory from being as general as claimed (see the remarks later
on in this paper, on the choice of the priors) and which makes the formalism
rather complicated. I show in the next section how it is possible to build an
alternative theory, based exclusively on probability “first principles”, which
is very close to the physicist’s intuition. In a certain sense the theory which
will be proposed here can be seen as nothing more than a formalization of
what most physicists unconsciously do.
A genuine Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty
In the Bayesian framework inference is performed by calculating the degrees
of belief of the true values of the physical quantities, taking into account
all the available information. Let us call x = {x1, x2, . . . , xnx} the n-tuple
(“vector”) of observables, µ = {µ1, µ2, . . . , µnµ} the n-tuple of the true values
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of the physical quantities of interest, and h = {h1, h2, . . . , hnh} the n-tuple of
all the possible realizations of the influence variablesHi. The term “influence
variable” is used here with an extended meaning, to indicate not only external
factors which could influence the result (temperature, atmospheric pressure,
etc.) but also any possible calibration constants and any source of systematic
errors. In fact the distinction between µ and h is artificial, since they are
all conditional hypotheses for x. We separate them simply because the aim
of the research is to obtain knowledge about µ, while h are considered a
nuisance.
The likelihood of the sample x being produced from h and µ is
f(x|µ, h,H◦) . (1)
H◦ is intended as a reminder that likelihoods and priors - and hence conclu-
sions - depend on all explicit and implicit assumptions within the problem,
and, in particular, on the parametric functions used to model priors and like-
lihoods. (To simplify the formulae, H◦ will no longer be written explicitly).
Notice that (1) has to be meant as a function f(·|µ, h) for all possible values
of the sample x, with no restrictions beyond those given by the coherence[7].
Using the Bayes’ theorem we obtain, given an initial f◦(µ) which describes
the different degrees of belief on all possible values of µ before the information
on x is available, a final distribution f(µ) for each possible set of values of
the influence variables h:
f(µ|x, h) = f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)dµ . (2)
Notice that the integral over a probability density function (instead of
a summation over discrete cases) is just used to simplify the notation. To
obtain the final distribution of µ one needs to re-weight (2) with the degrees
of belief on h:
f(µ|x) =
∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)f(h)dh∫
f(x|µ, h)f◦(µ)f(h)dµdh . (3)
The same comment on the use of the integration, made after (2), applies
here. Although (3) is seldom used by physicists, the formula is conceptually
equivalent to what experimentalists do when they vary all the parameters of
the Monte Carlo simulation in order to estimate the “systematic error”1.
1 Usually they are not interested in complete knowledge of f(µ) but only in best
estimates and variances, and normality is assumed. Typical expressions one can find in
publications, related to this procedure, are: “the following systematic checks have been
performed”, and then “systematic errors have been added quadratically”.
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Notice that an alternative way of getting f(µ) would be to first consider
an initial joint probability density function f◦(µ, h) and then to obtain f(µ)
as the marginal of the final distribution f(µ, h). Formula (3) is reobtained
if µ and h are independent and if f◦(µ, h) can be factorized into f◦(µ) and
f(h). But this could be interpreted as an explicit requirement that f(µ, h)
exists, or even that the existence of f(µ, h) is needed for the assessment
of f(x|µ, h). As stated previously, f(x|µ, h) simply describes the degree of
belief on x for any conceivable configuration {µ, h}, with no constraint other
than coherence. This corresponds to what experimentalists do when they
first give the result with “statistical uncertainty” only and then look for all
possible systematic effects and evaluate their related contributions to the
“global uncertainty”.
Some comments about the choice of the priors
I don’t think that the problem of the prior choice is a fundamental issue.
My view is that one should avoid pedantic discussions of the matter, because
the idea of “universally true priors” reminds me terribly of the Byzanthine
“angels’ sex” debates. If I had to give recommendations, they would be:
• the a priori probability should be chosen in the same spirit as the
rational person who places a bet, seeking to minimize the risk of losing;
• general principles may help, but, since it is difficult to apply elegant
theoretical ideas to all practical situations, in many circumstances the
guess of the “expert” can be relied on for guidance;
• in particular, I think - and in this respect I completely disagree with the
authors of [4] - there is no reason why the maximum entropy principle
should be used in an uncertainty theory, just because it is successful in
statistical mechanics. In my opinion, while the use of this principle in
the case of discrete random variables is as founded as Laplace’s indif-
ference principle, in the continuous case there exists the unavoidable
problem of the choice of the right metric (“what is uniform in x is not
uniform in x2”). It seems to me that the success of maximum entropy
in statistical mechanics should be simply considered a lucky instance
in which a physical scale (the Planck constant) provides the “right”
metrics in which the phase space cells are equiprobable.
In the following example I will use uniform and normal priors, which are
reasonable for the problems considered.
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An example: uncertainty due to unknown systematic
error of the instrument scale offset
In our scheme any influence quantity of which we do not know the exact
value is a source of systematic error. It will change the final distribution of
µ and hence its uncertainty. Let us take the case of the “zero” of an instru-
ment, the value of which is never known exactly, due to limited accuracy and
precision of the calibration. This lack of perfect knowledge can be modeled
assuming that the zero ”true value” Z is normally distributed around 0 (i.e.
the calibration was properly done!) with a standard deviation σZ . As far
as µ is concerned, one may attribute the same degree of belief to all of its
possible values. We can then take a uniform distribution defined over a large
interval, chosen according to the characteristics of the measuring device and
to our expectation on µ. An alternative choice of vague priors could be a
normal distribution with large variance and a reasonable average (the values
have to be suggested by the best available knowledge of the measurand and
of the experimental devices). For simplicity, a uniform distribution is chosen
in this example.
As far as f(x|µ, z) is concerned, we may assume that, for all possible
values of µ and z, the degree of belief for each value of the measured quantity
x can be described by a normal distribution with an expected value µ + z
and variance σ2
◦
:
f(x|µ, z) = 1√
2piσ◦
exp
[
−(x− µ− z)
2
2σ2
◦
]
. (4)
For each z of the instrument offset we have a set of degrees of belief on µ:
f(µ|x, z) = 1√
2piσ◦
exp
[
−(µ− (x− z))
2
2σ2
◦
]
. (5)
Weighting f(µ|z) with degrees of belief on z using (3) we finally obtain
f(µ) ≡ f(µ|x, . . . , f◦(z)) = 1√
2pi
√
σ2
◦
+ σ2Z
exp
[
− (µ− x)
2
2(σ2
◦
+ σ2Z)
]
. (6)
The result is that f(µ) is still a gaussian, but with a variance larger than that
due only to statistical effects. The global standard deviation is the quadratic
combination of that due to the statistical fluctuation of the data sample and
that due to the imperfect knowledge of the systematic effect:
σ2tot = σ
2
◦
+ σ2Z . (7)
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This formula is well known and widely used, although nobody seems to care
that it cannot be justified by conventional statistics.
It is interesting to notice that in this framework it makes no sense to speak
of “statistical” and “systematical” uncertainties, as if they were of a different
nature. They are all treated probabilistically. But this requires the concept of
probability to be related to lack of knowledge, and not simply to the outcome
of repeated experiments. This is in agreement with the classification in Type
A and Type B of the components of the uncertainty, recommended by the
BIPM.
If one has several sources of systematic errors, each related to an influence
quantity, and such that their variations around their nominal values produce
linear variations to the measured value, then the “usual” combination of
variances (and covariances) is obtained (see [1] for details).
If several measurements are affected by the same unknown systematic er-
ror, their results are expected to be correlated. For example, considering only
two measured values x1 and x2 of the true values µ1 and µ2, the likelihood is
f(x1, x2|µ1, µ2, z) = 1
2piσ1σ2
exp
[
−1
2
(
(x1 − µ1 − z)2
σ21
+
(x2 − µ2 − z)2
σ22
)]
.
(8)
The final distribution f(µ1, µ2) is a bivariate normal distribution with ex-
pected values x1 and x2. The diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are
σ2i + σ
2
Z , with i = 1, 2. The covariance between µ1 and µ2 is σZ and their
correlation factor is then
ρ(µ1, µ2) =
σ2Z√
σ21 + σ
2
Z
√
σ22 + σ
2
Z
. (9)
The correlation coefficient is positively defined, as the definition of the sys-
tematic error considered here implies. Furthermore, as expected, several
values influenced by the same unknown systematic error are correlated when
the uncertainty due to the systematic error is comparable to - or larger than
- the uncertainties due to sampling effects alone.
Conclusions
Bayesian statistics is closer to the physicist’s mentality and needs than one
may na¨ıvely think. A Bayesian theory of measurement uncertainty has the
simple and important role of formalizing what is often done, more or less
intuitively, by experimentalists in simple cases, and to give guidance in more
complex situations.
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As far as the choice of the priors and the interpretation of conditional
probability are concerned, it seems to me that, although it may look para-
doxical at first sight, the ”subjective” approach (a` la de Finetti) has the best
chance of achieving consensus among the scientific community (after some
initial resistance due to cultural prejudices).
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